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I. INTRODUCTION
It is perhaps appropriate to start this Article on trusts and conflict of laws
by noting that there are only minor differences in the law of trusts among the

states of the United States. The states uniformly are guided by the intention of
the settlor to be given effect, unless, in the particular instance, there is an
overwhelmingly strong public policy to the contrary. In looking back over his
definitive work on trusts, Austin Wakeman Scott noted:
There is not an American law of trusts, although the... judges have
occasionally spoken as though there were.... There is, nevertheless,
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an Anglo-American system of law, which consists of legal concepts
and principles and traditional techniques. It is this system, insofar as
it relates to trusts, with which I have been dealing in this treatise....
The remarkable thing, it seems to me, is not the divergences but the
similarities in the law of trusts as administered in the American states.
• .. [T]he concepts of the law of trusts are simple and easily
understood. They are based not on technique but on broad human
principles of conduct. They are based upon a sense ofjustice and fair
play.... The evolution of the trust has been a great adventure in the
field of jurisprudence. It has not ended. As long as the owner of
property can dispose of it in accordance with his legitimate wishes, the
great adventure will go on. The law of trusts is living law.'
This similarity of the law among the states greatly reduces the occasions on
which a conflict of laws occurs that leads to litigation. Consequently, the
Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"), particularly as regards conflict of laws, does not
break much new ground but primarily gives guidance to lawyers and their
clients, and, occasionally, to judges when litigation occurs. The guiding choice
of law is set out in two brief sections dealing with meaning and creation.
H1. UNIFORM TRUST CODE-SECTIONS 107 AND 403

SECTION 107, GOVERNING LAW. The meaning and effect of the
terms of a trust are determined by:
(1) the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms unless the
designation of that jurisdiction's law is contrary to a strong public
policy of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the
matter at issue; or

1. Austin Wakeman Scott, Epilogueto [VA] AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT&WILLAM
F. FRATCHER, THELAWOFTRUSTS 643-45 (4th ed. 1989) [hereinafter SCOTrONTRuSTS].
The "adventure" continues. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements,
and Trends in American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. RaV. 1877, 1883
(2000). According to Professor Halbach:
Property owners today generally have longer life spans and often live into
substantial periods of diminished physical or mental health. Trusts are also
now being used by broader segments of society than in the past, and with
greater diversity of objectives (ranging from tax and probate avoidance, to
property management late in life, to highly sophisticated multifamily,
multigeneration plans of disposition), but increasingly without aid of legal
counsel who are skilled in the complexities of estate and trust planning.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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(2) in the absence of a controlling designation in the terms of the
trust, the law of the jurisdiction having the most significant
relationship to the matter at issue.2
SECTION 403, TRUSTS CREATED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
A trust not created by will is validly created if its creation complies
with the law of the jurisdiction in which the trust instrument was
executed, or the law of the jurisdiction in which, at the time of
creation:
(1) the settlor was domiciled, had a place of abode, or was a national;
(2) a trustee was domiciled or had a place of business; or
3
(3) any trust property was located.
II. DOMINANT POLICY SHARED BY ALL STATES
The pervasive shared policy that controls nearly all issues in trust law is to
give effect to the settlor's intent. Indeed, the accepted definition of a trust is "a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising as a result of a
manifestation ofan intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person
who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of" others.'

2. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 107 (2000) [hereinafter UTC].

3. UTC § 403.
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996); see also
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS &
TRUSTEES § 1 (rev. 2d ed. 1984); ScoTt ON TRUSTS, supranote 1, § 2.3. Trust doctrine
is a creature ofAnglo-American common law and equity not normally found in civil law
nations, but it is becoming more widely recognized internationally. Cf.James Gordley,
The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some UnfinishedBusiness,88 CAL. L. REV.

1815, 1868-69 (2000). According to Professor Gordley:
It would not be fair to say that every difference between the Anglo-American
law and civil law of property reflects poorly on the Anglo-American law.
There is one creation of the courts of equity that is useful indeed and has no
civil law parallel: the trust. One person, the settlor, can transfer assets to
another, the "trustee," who is then obligated to use them for the benefit of
someone else, "the trust beneficiary." The trust is unlike a civil law mandate.
In a mandate, one person instructs another to perform an action on his behalf.
In a trust, the settlor can no longer exercise control over the trustee. A trust
is unlike a civil law contract in favor of a third party because the third party
has a real right to the assets in the trust, not merely a contract claim against
the trustee. In fact, the trust is so useful that civil law countries are
considering adopting it.
Id.; see also D.J. HAYTON, S.C.J.S. KORTMANN & H.L.E. VERHAGEN, PRINCIPLES
EUROPEAN TRUST LAW 13-21 (1999).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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This manifestation of intention is encapsulated in the "terms ofthe trust,"5 which
govern the interests and actions of the parties except when contrary to overriding
public policy prohibiting unlawful purposes relating to criminal or tortious acts,
fraud, economic regulation, or judicial enforcement of trusts.6 This policy of
giving effect to the settlor's intention not only permeates the substantive law of
trusts but also underlies the generally accepted choice of law applicable to
resolving most interstate and international issues relating to the interests or
propriety of acts of the parties.7 The policy of supporting the settlor's purpose
and intent is so strong that it is not unusual for a court to sustain that intent by
alternative reference to the law of a related state that validates the trust.8 The
rationale being that the settlor could have chosen the governing law, and the
settlor clearly intended to create a valid trust, hence sustaining the trust. Hence,
sustaining the trust is giving effect to that intention.
A trust is a dispositionofproperty from the owner to the trustee. Hence, the
trust is imposed on various assets that are effectively transferred. Without title
to assets in the trustee, there is normally no trust. As a consequence, an intended
trust can be valid as to those assets effectively transferred but not as to other
assets not effectively transferred. The administration of a trust may extend over
a long period of time and involve many different circumstances and parties.
Because of these complexities, it is necessary to consider the particular choice
of law issue in question in light of the circumstances related to the trust

5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996); UTC §
103(17). Of course, the intent must be manifested by evidence admissible in judicial
proceedings. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 20, 21, 22 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1996); UTC §§ 401,407.
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 28,29 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); UTC
§§ 404, 405, 406; see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supranote 4, § 211; SCOTT ON TRUSTS,
supra note 1, §§ 61-64. Economic regulation includes protection of family members
from disinheritance.
7. See, e.g., SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supranote 1, § 555. Giving weight to the purpose
ofthe local laws in question is a highly important factor in choice of law. See, e.g., Larry
Kramer, Rethinking Choice ofLaw, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277,296 (1990). According to
Professor Kramer:
The point is elegantly simple: if-in the interests of comity and mutual
accommodation-we presume that a state's law is intended to apply only in
cases that are connected to the state in some important way, the significant
contacts ought to be those that implicate the reasons the law was enacted for
wholly domestic cases.
Id.; see also Elliot E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choiceof the ApplicableLaw, 52
COLum. L. REv. 959, 965-69 (1952).
8. See, e.g., Estate of Klinkner, 151 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23 (Ct. App. 1975); Ford v.
Ford, 44 N.W. 1057, 1059-60 (Mich. 1890); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 269 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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regarding that particular issue: This disjunction of issues means that the choice
of law rules must be flexible enough to accommodate the variety of matters that
call for resolution. Each question needs to be approached as to how the settlor's
intention and the relevant law and policy relate to the narrow matter at issue. 9
UTC Section 107 reflects the strength of the policy of giving effect to the
settlor's intention by assigning first priority to the settlor's designation of the
governing law in determining the meaning and effect of the terms of the trust.
Because the settlor could spell out, or incorporate by reference, the meaning of
terms, it is appropriate for the settlor to designate the law by which meaning can
be assigned to trust terms.
In the absence of a designation, the default reference is to the law having
the most significant relationship to the matter of issue. This is the choice oflaw
approach articulated by the American Law Institute in the 1971 Restatement of
Conflict of Laws,10 and it directs the parties and courts to consider the
significance of presumed intention and the circumstances at the time the issue
arises. The approach taken in the UTC also parallels that of the Uniform

9. "It is necessary always to consider the precise questions at issue. Absolute rules
simply will not do." SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supranote 1, § 555. Prior to the mid-1930s in
the United States, jurisdictional concepts led to simple choice of law rules based on
single prominent factors such as the place ofthe tort, the place ofthe contract, or the situs
ofreal property. The situs rule was particularly dominating in Anglo-American trust law
because, historically, inter vivos trusts commonly involved a large productive parcel of
land to be administered to support a spouse and then to be turned over to mature children.
The central feature was to manage this key family asset. Because both land and chattels
were most frequently located at the domicile, testamentary trusts became identified with
the domicile without serious infringement on the situs rule. It was only when ownership
of land outside the domicile began to raise issues that situs courts began to hear conflict
of laws issues. The forum's judicial jurisdictional rules and its familiarity with local
conveyancing regulation reinforced the situs rule in resolving the occasional choice of
law case. With the increasing significance of trusts and wealth in the form of securities
and secured debt instruments, along with the increased mobility offamilies, choice of law
issues became more frequent and the inadequacies of simple rules became apparent.
During and following the promulgation ofthe first Restatementof Conflict ofLaws
in 1934, debate blossomed over what the courts were doing, in fact, and what they should
do, in this area. Many theories were articulated, but nearly all criticized single contact
rules as being inadequate and unjust in the varied circumstances ofmodem society. See
E. Cheatham, American Theories ofConflict ofLaws, 58 HARv. L. REV. 361,372 (1945).
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws articulated the Choice of Law approach

reflected in the UTC. The debate on how best to explain and theoretically to support the
evolving choice of law has continued, but nearly all commentators agree with Scott that
simple rules do not work. Austin Scott was Associate Reporter for the Restatement
(Second) ofConflict ofLaws, and Volume VA of Scott on Trusts is the leading treatment
of choice of law in trusts.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 222 (1971).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Commercial Code," although, in trusts, the governing intent is autonomous to
the settlor and not dependent on agreement of two or more parties. Referring to
the law of the state with the most significant relationship with regard to the
particular issue has dominated the resolution of conflict of laws issues in the
United States during the last half-century.' 2 This method means that the
resolution of disputes might involve reference to different law for different
issues. For example, if the settlor provided for the annual income to be divided
among "the children of my sons living in their household," and three sons lived
in states different from the settlor's domicile, different law could be utilized to
determine "children in the household" if that furthers the settlor's intention.
In the absence of settlor direction, Section 107's general reference to the
law of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at
issue is subject to the criticism of being a "non-rule" and overly vague. This
same criticism was leveled at the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, as

academics struggled to articulate the process of reasonable resolution where the
laws of two states are alleged to be controlling. However, the articulation of a
method of seeking a just resolution to the endless variety of circumstances
relevant to the meaning of the varied expressions of thousands of settlors
3
precludes simple, single-factor rules.'
Referring to the law of the state most significantly related to the issue
requires the parties and the courts to consider all of the factors bearing on the
settlor's intent and the reasonable expectations of the parties, as well as the
different policies of the states involved.'4 The most significant relationship to
the issue is simply an extension of the legal system's requirement and an

11. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (amended 2001) ("[T]he parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state.., shall govern.... Failing such agreement,
this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state."); U.C.C. §
1-301 (amended 2001).
12. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts
Restatement, 56 MD. L. REv. 1232 (1997); Friedrich K. Juenger, How Do You Rate a
Century?,37 WiLLAMETTL. REV.89 (2001); Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice
of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2001); see also
Kramer, supra note 7, at 296-97, 336-37. But c.f J.A. Schoenblum, Conflict of Laws
Underthe Uniform Trust Code, TRUSTS EATrIVITAFIDUCIARIE, 16-26 (Gennaio, 2001).
13. See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 1, § 555.
14. See WALTER W. LAND, L.L.M., TRUSTS INTHE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 21,37.1

(1940) (listing elements bearing on choice of law issues, such as: the domicile of the
settlor; the place in which the trust instrument was executed; the language of the trust
instrument; the location of the trust property; the domicile of the trustee; the domicile of
the beneficiary; the place in which the business of the trust is to be carried on; and, the
implied intention of the settlor); see also von Kaulbach v. Keoseian, 783 F. Supp. 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Davis v. Neilson, 871 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6,222 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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application of the lawyer's skill in determining the relevanceof facts and law to
a matter in dispute."s It also permits the development of more narrow
presumptive rules or presumptive choices as experience is acquired withprecise
issues arising from these variable factors. This also makes it appropriate for
legislative direction. It is especially appropriate in the Code because the past
development of choice of law in trust cases offers strong support for this
approach. The UTC provisions reflect the current evolving common law and
accommodate future development Looking at the particular issue in light of
intent and circumstances has led the courts to reach generally predictable choices
of law in the resolution of disputes in trusts when the settlor's direction is not
effective.t"
Of course, most questions are resolved by the settlor's directions, express
or implied. Because the settlor's intention is the primary factor, sustaining that
intention under the circumstances will resolve most differences. This means that
difficult choice of law problems do not often arise with regard to the terms ofthe
trust unless some element of state policy is urged to avoid a particular result.
It is important to emphasize the necessity of isolating and identifying the
particular narrow issue to be resolved. Significant considerations may involve
circumstances relating to the settlor's relationship to a particular jurisdiction,
such as domicile or the nature and location of property subject to the trust, or
whether the matter in dispute is the transfer of property into the trust, i.e., a
creation issue, ora trust administration matter, or amatter involving construction
of the trust terms. This multiplicity of issues has led to the development of
patterns ofresults on common matters that might be called sub-rules, whichhave
evolved from the encompassing approach reflected in the UTC.

15. See Kramer,supra note 7, at 301.
16. See, e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 24 A.2d 309, 314
(Del. Ch. 1942) (A New York inter vivos trust by a New Yorker had a successor trustee
appointed in Delaware. Later, a beneficiary exercised the power of appointment, which
would be valid only in Delaware. The appointment was sustained. "There is no
substantial reason why a donor, in dealing with that which is his own, may not provide
for a change in the location of his trust with a consequent shifting of the controlling
law."); Hope v. Brewer, 32 N.E. 558 (N.Y. 1892) (Devise of New York land to be sold
and proceeds to go to Scottish trustees for infirmary in Scotland. Disposition, void in
New York, sustained by Scot's Law.); Chappell's Estate, 213 P. 684 (Wash. 1923) (A
California testator's will created a trust of Washington personal property. The trust
violatedthe perpetuity limitin Califomiabutnotin Washington, andwas sustained even
without a choice of law clause because the testator obviously intended a valid trust and
that intent should be given effect if possible.).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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IV. NARROWING TiE ISSUES
In either litigation or planning, the first consideration usually is the creation
of the trust, which involves the effective transferof trust property to a trustee.
The formal requirements ofthe intended transfers are often dependent upon the
non-trust law relating to the ownership interest in the asset in question. For
example, a testamentary trust requires a valid will effectively transferring
property to the trustee.17 It is only after this first local law step of an effective
transfer, declaration, or exercise of a power that one gets to the requirements for
creating a trust summarized in UTC Section 402. Reflecting the policy of
furthering the testator's intention, most states have statutes sustaining .a will
devising movables or immovables if it complies with the law of any of several
alternative states referenced to the forum for consideration. The Uniform
Probate Code ("UPC") is illustrative of this point. UPC Section 2-506 provides:
A written will is valid if executed in compliance with Section 2-502
or 2-503 or if its execution complies with the law at the time of
execution of the place where the will is executed, or of the law of the
place where at the time of execution or at the time of death the testator
is domiciled, has a place of abode, or is a national."
These provisions of wills statutes, patterned after Britain's Lord
Kingsdown's Act, have led many to assert that a person hardly can die intestate
if a serious attempt is made to execute a will anywhere in the world. As a
consequence, there are few instances of invalid lawyer-drawn wills containing
testamentary trusts.
Trusts also can be created by transfer other than by will, such as a transfer
of property by deed, assignment, or delivery during the settlor's lifetime, by
declaration of the owner of property to hold in trust, or by exercise of power of
appointment. The appropriate choice of law will differ depending onthe method
of transferring property into the trust. To meet the requirements of these
different methods, the drafters of the UTC included Section 403, analogous to
UPC Section 2-506, reflecting the policy to further the intent of the settlor, a
policy shared by all states and nations recognizing trusts.
Under UTC Section 403, an inter vivos trust created outside the forum is
valid if it complies with the law of the place of execution of the trust instrument,
or where the settlor was domiciled, had a place of abode or was a national, or
where the trustee was domiciled or had a place of business, or where any trust
property was located. These alternative references sustain a trust that is created

17. See UTC § 401.
18. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-506 (amended 1998).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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by a transfer that complies with the law of the jurisdiction that is significantly
related to the transfer.
By the law of all states, certain formalities are required for the transfer of
real property, an immovable. These formalities of transfer led to an earlier
general statement that the law of the situs of land determines the validity of a
trust of immovables because, without an effective transfer to the trustee, no trust
would attach to the land. However, different questions oftrust-validity may turn
on whether the asset is subject to equitable conversion by direction to sell, or a
power to sell by trustee, or whether the real property is an investment or is
actually managed by the trustee, or whether corporate shares have been
substituted for the land, or whether the matter at issue relates to something other
than the land's use, occupancy, development, taxation, or regularity of title.' 9
Thus, a simple situs rule cannot accommodate the many different considerations
incident to real property included in trust assets or what a forum may call
immovables. Just as the alternative references to validate a will can sustain the
validity of a will creating a testamentary trust, most states also have statutes
validating inter vivos deeds of local land by alternative reference to the place of
execution, in addition to the situs.20 Of course, there may be substantive
questions of validity other than the formalities of a valid deed. Shortly put, if
these questions relate to use, occupancy, or regularity of title records, these are
issues to which the situs of land seems most significantly related. But if the
question refers to capacity of the owner or witness to a foreign execution,
construction of the terms of the trust, spousal consent, or power of the trustee,
the significance ofthe situs fades, and the reasonable expectations ofthe parties
2
and the settlor under other law become dominant. '
UTC Section 403 accommodates necessary consideration of the usual
interests of other states in questions relating to the valid creation of inter vivos
trusts. The reference to location ofproperty is significant as to movables, as well
as to immovables. The location of assets may impose requirements for valid
transfer. Chattels or intangibles chattelized by certificates of ownership, such as
securities, may be moved to a different jurisdiction and a trust created there

19. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 19.1-20.6 (3d ed. 2000).
20. See Earnest G. Lorenzen, The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as
RegardsForm in the Conflict ofLaws, 20 YALE L.J. 427, 431-34 (1911); see also 765
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23 (West 2001); KAN. STAT.ANN. § 58-2228 (1994); OR. REV.
STAT. § 194.555 (2001).
21. See R.J.WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARYONTHECONFLICrOFLAW §§ 8.10-.22 (4th
ed. 2001); Moffatt Hancock, In the ParishofSt. Mary le Bow in the WardofCheap, 16
STAN. L. REV. 561, 571 (1964); Robby Alden, Note, Modernizing the Situs RuleforReal
Property Conflicts, 65 TEx. L. REv. 585 (1987); cf. Saunders v. Saunders, 796 So. 2d
1253, 1254-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Rudow v. Fogel, 426 N.E.2d 155, 159-61
(Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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under the usual choice of law for transfers of movable property.'
The
possibility of sales in an open market protecting third parties introduces factors
that may override the interests of the settlor's domicile. Electronic transfer of
securities to a trust company acting as trustee in another jurisdiction illustrates
one instance in which the trustee's domicile or place of business reasonably
might be relied on to create a trust. Under the UTC, the enacting forum is
saying, "we will recognize a trust validly created as to property in another state
that has one of these significant relationships to its owner."
In addition to formal validity matters, substantive matters may limit the
settlor's autonomy in a disposition in trust. For example, the strong policy of
protecting a spouse's reasonably expected participation in the assets of a
decedent at death may invalidate, at least in part, a unilateral disposition by the
other spouse. This protective policy touches only lightly in relation to the
particular assets but rather arises out of the state's interest in the marital or
domestic relations of its citizens. A question about whether a trust disposition
is in violation of spousal rights has little significance with regard to the location
of the asset except to protect innocent purchasers relying on the record or market
circumstances. One would expect a court to apply the law of the marital
domicile rather than that of the situs of assets to measure spousal rights.'
V. PRACTICAL RESOLUTION OF CHOICE OF LAW ISSUES
In the process of identifying and resolving the particular matter in dispute,
it is necessary to distinguish matters relating to validity from matters of
construction. In matters of validity, the formalities necessary to transfer
particular assets must be distinguished from substantive limitations based on

22. See SCOLES ET AL., supranote 19, §§ 19.11-.32.
23. See E. Scoles, Choice of Law in Family Property Transactions,209 HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INT'L LAW RECUEmL DES COURS 79 (1988-IH) [hereinafter Scoles, Family
Property]; Eugene F. Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Nonbarrable Interests in
Administration of Decedents'Estates,8 U. FLA. L. REv. 151, 172 (1955) [hereinafter
Scoles, NonbarrableInterests]; cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(b) (amended 1998).
The relevant policy is aptly stated in In re Estate of Clark, 236 N.E.2d 152, 156, 158
(N.Y. 1968). According to the court:
As between two states, the law of that one which has the predominant, if not
the sole, interest in the protection and regulation of the rights of the person or
persons involved should, of course, be invoked ....
"In sum, Virginia's
overwhelming interest in the protection of surviving spouses domiciled there
demands that we apply its law to give the widow in this case the right of
election provided for her under that law. We find nothing.., in the public
policy of New York which would permit a decedent, by a mere expression of
intent, to change this result."
Id. But cf Nat'l Shawmat Bank v. Cumming, 91 N.E.2d 337, 340-41 (Mass. 1950).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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other policies of the law. Questions of substantive validity generally concern
limits on the settlor's methods or powers of disposition, i.e., matters beyond the
settlor's control. In matters of construction, a distinction needs to be made
between matters concerning the substantive dispositions to beneficiaries and
matters concerning the administration of the trust. Matters of construction are
largely subject to the settlor's control as an extension of the settlor's intention,
express or implied, although even a dispositive provision or action of the trustee
may lead to a judicial modification of the settlor's intention by reason of the
force of a limiting state policy.
An issue related in part to creation and in part to administration involves the
revocability of a trust. Whether a trust is revocable or irrevocable seems to be
a matter related to its creation but is subject to the expressed or implied intention
of the settlor. Thus, if a trust is created in one state by a settlor domiciled in
another state, a choice of law clause would control. Absent designation by the
settlor, the matter may -welldepend on when and how the issue is raised, i.e., by
an attack at the time of creation or after the trust has been operating, as in an
attack by creditors. Whether a trust is revoked by subsequent action of the
settlor involves the exercise of a power reserved by the settlor and notice
directed to the trustee. This, rather clearly, would be subject to the settlor's
direction in the trust. In the absence of direction, the law ofthe place where the
trust is administered and the trustee must account would seem most appropriate.
These issues are possible because most states have a presumption that a trust is
irrevocable in the absence of a reservation of the power to revoke. The UTC in
Section 602 changes this presumption. Under the UTC, a trust, is revocable
unless expressly made irrevocable.
As revocation and amendment both involve post-creation acts by the settlor,
a similar approach would seem applicable to amendment issues. Further,
releases of the power of revocation also would seem to be sustained by the law
of the place of administration or by the law chosen by the settlor.2'
Whatever the issue, the courts generally try to give effect to the settlor's
dispositive scheme as far as possible. With regard to validity issues, this
frequently means sustaining the validity by any reasonably related law under
Section 403. In construction matters regarding dispositions or administrative
matters, the settlor's expressed or implied intent controls against the background
of the law of the state having the most significant relationship to the matter at
issue, as in Section 107. Some examples of common concerns under the UTC
follow.

24. See ScoTT ON TRUSTS, supranote 1, § 581.
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A. Validity of Trusts-Formalities
1. Testamentary Trusts of Movables and Immovables
Early on, the common law developed the choice of law reference to the law
of the decedent's domicile at death to determine the validity of a will of
movables. The effect was to sustain wills, as most movables in a person's estate
usually were located at the decedent's family home, and it was deemed desirable
that the estate be administered as a unit.' Also, in early times, real estate was
not administered as a general asset in the decedent's estate, so no occasion for
choice of law arose. Later, statutes were enacted to sustain the will if there was
a change of domicile after a valid execution at a former domicile. 26 In 1861,
England enacted Lord Kingdown's Act that sustained wills of British subjects
valid under the law of England, the place of execution, the decedent's domicile
at time of execution, or the decedent's domicile of origin in the British
dominions.2 7 At about the same time, the matter began receiving legislative
attention in the United States. In 1910, the Uniform Wills Act, Foreign
Executed, was promulgated, sustaining a will valid either where executed or at
the testator's domicile. This Uniform Act was followed in 1940 by the Model
Execution of Wills Act, which sustained wills valid at the place of execution, or
the testator's domicile at death or domicile at time of execution. These acts were
widely adopted in the United States, and, as real estate became more frequently
subject to probate and administration, these statutes usually applied to both real
and personal property.2" In recognition of the strong policy to further the
testator's intention, the 1969 Uniform Probate Code expanded this approach to
sustain a written will if executed in accordance with the law of the forum state;
in accordance with the law at the time of execution at the place of execution; or

25. See SCOLES ETAL., supra note 19, §§ 20.3, 20.9.
26.

See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supranote 1, § 589.

27. Wills Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 114 (Eng.).
28. See, for example, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 3-5.1(c) (McKinney
1998), which states:
(c) A will disposing of personal property, wherever situated, or real property
situated in this state, made within or without this state by a domiciliary or
non-domiciliary thereof, is formally valid and admissible to probate in this
state, if it is in writing and signed by the testator, and otherwise executed and
attested in accordance with the local law of:
(1) This state;
(2) The jurisdiction in which the will was executed, at the time of

execution; or
(3)The jurisdiction in which the testator was domiciled, either at the
time of execution or of death.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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with the law where, at the time of execution or at the time of death, the testator
was domiciled, had a place of abode, or was a national.29 The UPC reflected
concern for international wills, as well as the experience in England with the
Wills Act of 1963.30 The references to nationality and place of abode
accommodate the civil law countries' reliance on nationality and habitual
residence rather than the common law of domicile. Because of the strength of
the commonly-shared policy of furthering testamentary intent and the very slight
differences in formalities for executing wills, "place of abode" avoids litigation
over variations in the overlapping concepts of "domicile" and "habitual
residence." 3' Further, a person wanting to execute a will is most likely to think
about and attempt to satisfy the legal requirements where he or she lives or
where he or she seeks legal assistance. Thus, a person who seriously wants to
execute a will scarcely can die intestate even as between states where the
common purpose of the rules for valid execution may be differently articulated.
As a consequence ofthis development, the formal validity oftestamentary trusts,
being dependent on the validity of the testamentary instrument of transfer,
*seldomis in doubt. While the choice of law rule focused on the state of the most
significant relationship, i.e., the domicile, statutes also included the place of
execution in order to give maximum effect to the shared policy to support the
dispositive intent of the owner of property, reasonably expressed.
2. Inter Vivos Trusts of Movables
Trusts have a long history, and the policy of carrying out the settlor's
dispositive intent is equally strong and applicable to both inter vivos and
testamentary trusts. The incidents of choice of law problems involving the
formal validity of inter vivos trusts rarely arise because the inter vivos trust is
usually a planned transfer of property to the trustee. Lawyers simply make sure
that all steps necessary for the transfer are taken, and, if there is an omission, go
back and correct it with further documentation by the settlor. The sporadic
common law cases indicated that the settlor's intent should be carried out,32 and

29. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-506 (amended 1998).
30. Wills Act, 1963, 11 & 12 Eliz. 2, c. 44 (Eng.).
31. See Eugene F. Scoles, The Hague Conventionon Succession, 42 AM. J. COMP.
L. 85, 90,98-99,105 (1994); Symeon Symeonides, Louisiana'sDrafton Succession and
MaritalProperty, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 259, 270-81 (1987).

32. See, e.g., Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 9 N.E.2d 792,795 (N.Y. 1937) ("[W]e
find nothing in our public policy which forbids extending comity and applying the New
Jersey laws so as to carry out the wish of the settlor and sustain the trust.'); Hutchison
v. Ross, 187 N.E. 65, 70 (N.Y. 1933) ("Where a non-resident settlor establishes here a
trust of personal property intending that the trust should be governed by the law of this
jurisdiction, there is little reason why the courts should defeat his intention by applying
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the analogy to the desirability of sustaining the formal validity of wills was clear
to legislative drafters. Because inter vivos trusts are created by transfers of
property by a competent living owner, the choice of law references in any
legislation sustaining the settlor's intent needed to accommodate the law of the
jurisdictions related to inter vivos transfers of property to another, the declaration
of trust by an owner, and the creation of a trust by exercise of a power of
appointment, as well as by will.33 The existing choice of law rules regarding
these types of inter vivos transfers focused on the law most significantly related
to the transfer. As to chattels or chattelized interests such as securities, the place
where the goods or negotiable documents of title were located at the time of the
transfer was important as market considerations were necessary and delivery was
a significant factor.' Similar market considerations existed in assets subject to
registration or recording, such as land, when compliance with the law of the situs
at the time of the transfer supported the title of the trustee and of the trustee's
transferees.3
Many trustees required or encouraged parties to satisfy the
requirements of transfer under the law to which the trustee was most likely to be
subjected, namely the trustee's domicile or place of business. Capacity of the
settlor and satisfaction of requirements of the law most related to the settlor
would seem to suggest satisfying the standards at the settlor's domicile.
However, because of the many forms in which ownership interests in property
may be represented and because of the transactional mobility of owners, not all
of these jurisdictional reference points occur in all transfers in trust. As to some
issues of formal validity, domicile of the settlor is sufficient; as to others,
satisfaction of the law of the situs is sufficient. But the underlying purpose of
all ofthe transfer requirements is to provide evidence demonstrating the settlor's
intent, and the state-to-state variations in the detail of demonstrating that intent
are minor. There is little difference in the policy among these jurisdictions as
they all attempt to sustain the settlor's intended disposition reasonably
evidenced. Consequently, in order reasonably to sustain the settlor's intention
to create a trust, on the analogy to existing wills legislation, the UTC necessarily
provides the alternative references in Section 403.

the law of another jurisdiction.").
33. See UTC §401.
34. See Morson v.Second Nat'l Bank of Boston, 29 N.E.2d 19, 20-21 (Mass.
1940); SCOLES ET AL., supranote 19, §§ 19.11-.32.
35. See SCOLES T iAL.,
supranote 19, §§ 19.1-.10.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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3. Inter Vivos Trusts of Immovables
The alternative references in Section 403 apply to all assets, including real
property, as has been the approach of the states in sustaining wills. 3 6 The many

statutes validating deeds of local land by either the place ofexecution or the situs
support this alternative approachbecause differences in formalities are slightand
all share the policy ofsustaining the intended transfer ofthe ownerby reasonable
37
evidence of intent.
Because of jurisdictional limitations, litigation regarding transfers of real
property nearly always occurs in the courts of the situs of real property. If the
state of the situs enacts Section 403, that state validates the trust as to all assets
in the state, but jurisdictional considerations would limit its determination, other
than between the parties before it, as to other assets. If a non-situs state has
Section 403 and the situs state does not, the situs state must decide whether its
policy of carrying out the testator's intended transfer and its interest in interstate
comity would permit the trustee to complete the transaction, for example, either
by exercise of power or by specific performance, in the absence of formal
compliance with local law in the trust creation. Obviously, this is a rare case
concerning inter vivos trusts, for the parties simply would comply unless death
or a subsequent change of mind intervened.

B. Validity-Matters ofSubstance
In addition to formalities, Section 403 purports to apply "to the entire
process of a trust's creation, including... [the requirement] that there be trust
property."3' This process clearly would apply to the elements treated in Sections
401 to 409. As to such issues as trust purposes or charitable nature, it is highly
unlikely that there would be differences of law or policy sufficient to raise a
question of adverse public policy. The rarity of invalidity for issues within
Sections 401 to 409 results also from the consideration that the trust attaches to
different items of property, and there is a general recognition of the utility of
treating the assets similarly in administering the trust. However, the reach of
Section 403 to cover an issue of validity relating to matters other than those
suggested by Sections 401 to 409 may be unclear. To the extent that a matter is
not within the Code, the common law will apply.

36. Supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; see N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST
LAw § 3-501(c) (McKinney 1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-506 (amended 1998).
37. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2228

(1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 194.555 (2001).
38. UTC § 403 cmt.; see also Lorenzen, supranote 20, at 461-62; supranote 20

and accompanying text.
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1. Transfer in Fraud of Creditors
Attacks on the disposition of assets in trust can raise questions of the
validity of a gratuitous transfer to another as possibly being in fraud of the
settlor's existing creditors. UTC Section 505, Creditors Claims Against the
Settlor, deals with claims asserted against any beneficial interest in the trust
retained by the settlor. This Section subjects a revocable trust to the settlor's
creditors during life or at death. This limits the concerns of existing creditors to
the creation of an irrevocable trust. The comment to Section 505 declares that
"[t]his subject.., is left to the State's law on fraudulent transfers" or federal
bankruptcy law. Likewise, issues relating to defects in the settlor's asserted
ownership also would be left to other law.
2. Spousal and Family Protection
Possible family protection claims against irrevocable trusts are not treated
in the UTC and are left to other law. Spousal claims against inter vivos
irrevocable trusts are generally treated as raising issues of ownership, such as in
community property or, occasionally on analogy to creditors, fraud on the
spousal share.39 The matter of potential claims by family members at the
settlor's death is specifically treated in Section 505 as to trusts revocable at the
settlor's death by subjecting the trust assets to such claims to extent the probate
estate is inadequate. The major family protection claim in states without
community property is generally at the death of the settlor of a revocable trust.
The issue of what law determines the extent of the spouse's share is not treated
in the UTC. This issue of the appropriate law to measure the spouse's claim is
viewed generally as a probate matter.4' Also, it does not fit comfortably within
Section 403 particularly to preclude or limit the spousal or family claim. Nor are
these nonbarrable interests something over which the settlor has control, and, as
a consequence, Section 107 should not be viewed as permitting the testator to cut
them off by choice of law. It is here that the concept of referring to the law of
the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter in dispute
should be utilized to resolve these issues. The debate over whether other situs
states should defer to the domicile at death has been treated at length
elsewhere. 4' The applicable policies rather clearly indicate that the family
center, i.e., the testator's domicile, is the state whose law is most significantly
related to what interests family members may assert to overcome the testator's

39. See W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960); Scoles,
Family Property,supranote 23, at 60.
40. Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-202 (amended 1998).

41. See generally Scoles, NonbarrableInterests, supranote 23.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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intention to deprive them.42 As to testamentary dispositions, the matter is
specifically treated in UPC Section 2-201(a), which gives the "surviving spouse
of a decedent domiciled in this State" an elective share,43 and in UPC Section 2201 (c), which provides that the right of the spouse of a non-domiciliary decedent
to an elective share "is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at
death."' This reference to the decadent's domicile is supported in the cases.4"
Statutes permitting the testator's intent to override these interests are contrary to
the policy of providing nonbarrable family protection interests. Further, to
provide a nonbarrable share to domestic spouses but to deny the claim of the
spouse of a decedent domiciled elsewhere well may violate constitutional
concepts of equal protection.
3. Homestead
Depending upon the detail of local law, homestead rights for family
members may limit the owner's disposition of particular assets. It is not
frequently a matter that raises choice of law problems because homestead rights
usually attach to particular assets located in the domicile. The real property
constituting the home of the decedent and the furnishings of the home are the
usual subjects of homestead laws. Because any choice of law and jurisdiction
over the assets center in the forum, as the domicile of the decedent at death, local
law is the source for both determination of rights and enforcement.
4. Rule Against Perpetuities
While it is possible to assert that a violation of the forum's rule against
perpetuities is a matter of validity, these issues relate to the nature of the interest
given in the disposition. Choice of law issues relating to perpetuities questions
will be treated below in considering construction of dispositions.

C. Interpretation/Construction-Dispositive
Provisions
UTC Section 107, as was noted above, is a strong declaration of the
pervasive purpose in trust law to carry out the settlor's intent. The choice of law
directive in Section 107(a) is that "the meaning and effect" of the terms ofa trust
are determined by the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms "unless"
contrary to a strong public policy of the jurisdiction having the most significant

42. See Scoles, Family Property,supra note 23, at 65.
43. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(a) (amended 1998).
44. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(c) (amended 1998).
45. See SCOLES ET AL., supranote 19, §§ 20.14-.15.
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relationship to the matter at issue.' Thus, the enacting forum is saying, "our
principal policy is to give effect to settlor's intention, and we will honor his
direction as to the legal background against which to read his dispositions in
trust." Further, the forum is saying, "the only limitation on those dispositive
directions is strongly overriding public policy of the jurisdiction most
significantly related to, i.e., is the most concerned about, the particular matter at
issue." The latter is a recognition by the enacting forum that the differences of
policy among the states limiting intention are very slight, and, in the interest of
comity, the forum will defer to another state that is more genuinely concerned
with the matter. There are generally two kinds of questions that arise as to a trust
that is validly created. The first relates to matters that the settlor could spell out
in detail but the actual meaning is somehow incomplete or ambiguous. This is
a matter ofseeking the actual intention of the terms used from whatever evidence
of usage is available. This is largely a question of fact, and no choice of law is
raised. If the evidence does not provide adequate direction, the courts will fall
back to the presumed meaning of the terms against the legal background that the
settlor probably had in mind, or would have had in mind if he had thought about
it, when the terms were used. These matters are the kinds of things that raise
only issues of what the settlor did, not whether the settlor legally could do it.
The second kind of question is reached when the matter involves some legal
limitation on the disposition the settlor has provided in the trust. Examples of
the first of these will be discussed first.
1. Meaning of Trust Terms
As noted above, the forum court, called upon to interpret terms of a trust,
first will look to the language used in light of the circumstance surrounding the
settlor at the time the trust was created. However, when this initial attempt at
interpretation fails, the court may engage in construction, i.e., adopt the meaning
as presumed in the legal system most relevant to the matter in dispute. 47 As this

46. UTC § 107(a).
47. See, e.g., Second Bank-State St. Trust Co. v. Weston, 174 N.E.2d 763, 765-67
(Mass. 1961). A Maryland testatrix willed her estate to Massachusetts trustees in trust
for her daughters with gift over on her daughters' death without issue to the testatrix's
"heirs at law." Id. at 765. The court applied the Maryland rule to refer to heirs at the
time ofdeath ofthe surviving daughter, contrary to the Massachusetts rule. Id. at 766-67.

The court described its process as follows:
We first attempt to ascertain the testatrix's intention by interpretation of the
language used by her, giving weight to the ordinary meaning of the words

used, the context in which they appear, and other relevant evidence, including
the circumstances in which the will was drafted. If her intention cannot be
ascertained by such interpretation we must have resort to rules of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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is an effort to assign meaning, the settlor could incorporate by reference the law
by which meaning is defined and effect is determined. The choice of law
designation in Section 107(1) does that, and the court will follow that direction.
This rationale and result reflect the commonly-accepted approach taken by the
courts in common law cases.48
The settlor's designation could refer particular issues to different law. For
example, it is not uncommon to assign different law to construction of
dispositions and to administrative matters, or the designation may cover only
selected matters, such as compensation ofthe trustee. The only limitation occurs
when the designation somehow raises a possible contrary policy related to the
disposition or the trustee's action in question. The significant policy in such a
case is that of the state mostly strongly related to or concerned with the matter
at issue.
In this approach, the settlor can direct that most issues be relegated to a
particular legal system. This obviously simplifies matters for the parties and the
courts, and is the course frequently advised by experienced lawyers. Care,
however, needs to be taken by the lawyer in drafting choice of law clauses;
consideration must be given to the different states whose policies may impact the
many aspects of the trust. The lawyer's interest in the simplicity of resolving
issues by a blanket reference of "all matters" to the law most familiar to the
drafter, in some instances, can override the reasonable expectations of the settlor
and the parties as the trust continues over the years.

construction.

Id. at 765-66.
Failing to find adequate evidence of guiding intention, the court turned to
construction and concluded:
We are concerned, however, with the construction of a testamentary trust of

movables in matters not relating to its administration. The rules of
construction at the testator's domicil should be applied in such matters, in the
absence of indication that the testator intended some other law to be applied
or adopted an instrument drafted under the principles of some other law....
Although this trust had Massachusetts aspects, we find no indication that the
testatrix affirmatively intended that the substantive provisions of her will
should be construed in accordance with Massachusetts rules. Accordingly,
we are remitted to the Maryland law.
Id. at 767.
48. See, e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Annan, 531 A.2d 1209, 1215 (Del. Ch.
1987); In re Moore, 493 N.Y.S.2d 924, 925-26 (Sup. Ct. 1985); see also SCOTT ON
TRUSTs, supra note 1, § 575; M.A. Moore, Choice ofLaw in Trusts: How Broad the
Spectrum, 36th UNIV. OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST.
PL., 6-1 (2002); cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-601, 2-701 (amended 1998).
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Ifthe governing law direction is absent or fails, then the court would choose
the law of the jurisdiction most related. A few examples follow. Matters of
administration are separately treated subsequently.
Non-administrative issues usually relate to identification of beneficiaries or
the extent of an interest given. For example, an identification issue arises when
the income from property is given to son A for life, and, at A's death, the
property goes to his children. IfA and his family live in a different state from
the forum and his family includes natural born and adopted children, there may
be a choice of law issue asserted if the law of the settlor's domicile and A's
domicile differ on whether "children" is presumed to include adopted children.
While this is a matter that the settlor could have clearly provided, if the evidence
does not show his preference, which view should the court take? What
"children" are meant? As the settlor was obviously thinking ofA andA's family,
it would seem that the law that reasonably should determine the meaning of A's
family as the law most significantly related to A's family, and that would be A's
domicile at the time ofA's death. However, as a caveat, this has been an area in
which the settlor's domicile has been the dominant choice under the usual
approach in wills and under a broad choice of law clause.49
A few observations on this case illustrate that, while results under Section
107 are not always predictable, there is guidance on how these cases may be
resolved. Consider the blanket direction by the settlor that "the law of the state
of my domicile shall govern all matters under this trust." Such a blanket
direction in the case with a trust for A's "children" where the laws relating to
adoption differ, could exclude children adopted at birth and reasonably
consideredby the settlor andA to be included.i ° Drafting care needs to be taken.
A similar unsatisfactory result might be reached under the common application
of the decedent's domiciliary law to testamentary trusts. 5 ' In such a case,
considering the present policy to treat adopted and natural children alike for
property purposes, the court likely would avoid the choice of law issue by
finding factual support for interpreting the trust to include the adopted children.52
If the law changed after the trust was created, the fact pattern could mean that the
uncontemplated change was not intended to be included in the settlor's direction.
Or, if after the settlor had died, A, late in life, adopted a spouse, a housekeeper,
or a gay partner, the application of the settlor's direction probably would be
questioned and the court would be forced to decide the matter. At that point,
49. See ScoTr ON TRUSTS, supranote 1, § 578; see also supra note 47.
50. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Brunton, 74 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258-59 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
51. See, e.g., Houghton v. Hughes, 79 A. 909 (Me. 1911); In re Battell's Will, 35
N.E.2d 913, 915-916 (N.Y. 1941).
52. See Halbach,supranote 1, at 1905; cf McIlvaine v. Am. South Bank N.A., 581
So. 2d 454, 458-61 (Ala. 1991).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3

20

Scoles: Scoles:Removal of Corporate Trustees under the Uniform Trust Code

2002]

CHOICEOFLA WAND THE UTC

even though a maximum degree of prediction could not be expected, still the
court is directed to consider the law most significantly related to the matter at
issue in that particular case.
While the search for intent in testamentary trusts often centers on the
domicile of the settlor, as the courts have done historically, UTC Section 107
invites the scrivener to anticipate the significance of circumstances surrounding
potential choice of law issues, and to solicit and express the settlor's preference
clearly. This instructive aspect is a laudable objective of the statute. This is
particularly true in the drafting of inter vivos trusts where it is usually
appropriate to designate the law of the place of administration, Le., the domicile
or place of business of the trustee, to govern matters of administration.
However, the choice of law clause drafted to ease administration should not
necessarily or thoughtlessly govern dispositive provisions. The circumstances
and reasonable expectations ofthe settlorandbeneficiaries shouldbe considered
and not overridden by trustee concern for familiar local law. The search and
regard for the settlor's true intention is essentially the same in both testamentary
and inter vivos trusts. Also, with regard to identifying and respecting the
settlor's intention, similar considerations of the settlor's intention should be
made with respect to different assets. While the settlor's intention may be
related to a particular beneficiary having a particular benefit in specific assets,
for example, occupancy of real estate, voting rights in a closed corporation, or
even employment in an enterprise, the trust instrument should consider and
direct the governing law as to the dispositive interest in the event matters not
specifically addressed occur during the course of the trust.
In this era of migrating family members, this Section imposes
responsibility on those advising settlors and drafting trusts to give choice of law
matters close study. As to the rare case of peculiar, unanticipated facts, the
statute essentially leads the courts or the parties to consider the relevance of all
circumstances to the matter at issue. In dealing with unpredictable human
activity, this is what society and the law are forced to do.
2. Trust Dispositions and Contrary Public Policy
A disposition of property in trust under directions that raise questions of
public policy falls somewhere between matters of substantive validity and
matters of construction. Here, as in other matters, the courts have attempted to
sustain the testator's intention, if valid, under the law of a state reasonably
related to the matter at issue.
The comment to UTC Section 107 notes that the governing law designated
to determine the meaning and effect ofterms need notbe otherwise related to the
trust. This reflects the rationale that the designation is similar to incorporating
by reference a law spelling out that meaning. While this autonomy is
purportedly given by the first part ofUTC Section 107(1), it is taken away by the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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"unless" clause if the designated law "is contrary to the strong public policy" of
the jurisdiction most significantly related to the matter at issue. In other words,
if the application of the law chosen is strongly contrary to the law of the state
that is genuinely concerned with the matter, the choice is ineffective as to that
matter. 3 On the other hand, a thoughtful estate planner rarely, if ever, would
designate an unrelated law in drafting a trust for a client.
Cases involving the rule against perpetuities in the past have raised issues
of construction and validity, and they may well arise in the future in light of
recent legislation in different states. If the policy differences are minor, such as
differing numbers of lives or years measuring the permissive time, it would seem
the testator's intention would be sustained if a reasonably related state permitted
54
it.
Perpetuity problems relate to the manner in which property is held and the
impact that has on economic or market interests. These often are interrelated
particularly with regard to land. However, the strength of restrictive policies
may depend on whether the affected asset is subject to a power of sale, a
direction to sell, or a direction to retain. Also, there are different legislative
views as to the effect of a violation, Le., whether the gift fails, or is modified or
pruned back to conformity, or whether determination awaits the actual facts. In
each of these cases, it seems probable that the intention of the settlor will be
found to intend the application of the law having the least destructive impact on
the intended disposition.55

53. See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supranote 1, § 591. The limitation of public policy is
the forum's traditional escape valve from flagrantly offensive results in choice oflaw and
probably would be available to the forum even without the statutory restatement. This
residual exception to the application of foreign law is to be resorted to only when the
fundamental policy of the most concerned state is seriously offended. Mere difference
in the law or results are not enough to involve this seldom-used doctrine. Judge
Cardozo's classic statement counseled against parochial use of the public policy
exception unless application of the foreign law "would violate some fundamental
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the commonwealth." Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. ofN.Y., 120 N.E. 198,202
(N.Y. 1918); see also SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, §§ 3.15-.18; HAGUE CONVENTION
ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO TRUSTS AND THEIR RECOGNITION, Arts. 6, 18 (1985).

54. A leading case is Cross v. United States Trust Co. ofNew York, 30 N.E. 125
(N.Y. 1892), in which the New York court sustained a trust that violated the New York
perpetuities rule. The testamentary trust of a Rhode Island testator consisted ofmovables
in New York to be administered in New York by a New York trustee. Id. at 125-26. The
New York court held the trust valid under the more liberal Rhode Island rule against
perpetuities and not contrary to New York public policy. See id. at 127-30; see also
SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 1, § 593; Halbach, supra note 1, at 1893.
55. See Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 9 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1937). Shannon involved
an attack on an inter vivos irrevocable trust by a son who received a limited income
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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Perpetual trusts raise a perpetuity question that goes to the entire trust and
not simply to a particular asset's disposition. If there is an effort to evade the
law of a settlor's domiciliary forum that is also the place of administration of a
long continuing trust for family purposes, the forum may impose a perpetuities
limitation to accommodate its policy, which favors turning property over every
two generations. Whether a forum at the place of administration would respect
a duration limitation of a settlor's foreign domicile out of a sense of comity
seems more doubtful. It is upon this latter uncertain assumption of comity that
the "runaway" dynasty trust is considered potentially viable. 6 There is a
substantial difference between the usual perpetuities problem with a particular
disposition, as discussed above, and the perpetual or dynasty trust in which the
policy issue encompasses the entire trust. It is quite possible that an interested
forum would find a greater contrary policy in the case of a perpetual trust than
the usual perpetuity case. Hence, such an interested forum might entertain an
imaginative attack on the trust as to elements within its jurisdiction."
An analogous problem exists with so-called asset protection trusts that
attempt to avoid exceptions to spendthrift trust doctrines or other law subjecting
assets to governmental or other claims against the beneficial owners. 8 The
policy against defrauding creditors has led the domiciliary forum to impose
personal contempt sanctions on local settlors59 of foreign asset protection trusts

to coerce the repatriation of assets from a trust created and administered in an

interest with the excess to be accumulated for the son's issue or a Pennsylvania charity.
Id. at 793. The trust administered by the New York trustee violated the New York rule
on accumulations but not the rule of New Jersey, the domicile ofthe settlor and the state
whose law the settlor directed to apply to matters other than the trustee's compensation,
which was to be governed by New York law. Id. The court sustained the trust and
stated: "The instrument should be construed and a determination of its validity made
according to the law chosen by the settlor unless so to do is contrary to the public policy
of this state." Id. at 794. "[W]e find nothing in our public policy which forbids
extending comity and applying the New Jersey law so as to carry out the wish of the

settlor and sustain the trust." Id. at 795.
In a somewhat analogous area of public policy, the pattern of cases has been to
sustain contracts against the charge of usury by alternative reference to the most lenient
law. SeeRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONFLICTOFLAWS § 203 (1971); cf.Shannon-Vail
Five Inc. v. Bunch, 270 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2001).
56. Cf.Shannon-Vail, 270 F.3d at 1213-14; Cross, 30 N.E. at 125.
57. Cf.RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OFLAWS § 90 (1971); John Bernard
Corr, Modem Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor Has the Same Old
Clothes, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 647, 649, 695 (1985); Conrad G. Paulsen & Michael I.
Sovem, "PublicPolicy" in the Conflict ofLaws, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 969, 972 (1956).

58. See UTC §§ 501-507.
59. It perhaps also includes even attorneys who knowingly assist clients in
defrauding others. Cf.MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (amended 1998).
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off-shore jurisdiction.6 ° As in all such cases, the forum's jurisdictional reach
over parties or assets is usually the dominant factor in determining the outcome
of attempts to reach assets in trusts set up to evade local restrictions at the
settlor's domicile or place of business.
The use of asset protection trusts to avoid spousal or family obligations of
the settlor is likely to raise serious questions of policy. While the concept of
fraud on the spouse has lost much of its force in recent years, the clear violation
of the policy of the highly interested forum at the marital domicile could
engender attacks on interests of parties to a foreign asset protection trust or their
6
attorneys who set up the trust. '
D. Construction-AdministrativeProvisions
1. Powers of Trustee
Trust administration is an area nearly completely within the control of the
settlor, excepting only limited elements that are so important to the recognition
of the trust concept, to the protection of the beneficiaries, or to the protection of
the public, that they cannot be dispensed with by the settlor. For example, if
there is no obligation to observe the fiduciary relationship or there is no
obligation on the trustee to account for wrongdoing, there is no trust; the
alternative is an outright gift to the trustee. UTC Section 105 lists these matters
that are such important aspects of an intended trust that they cannot be waived
by the settlor.62
Many ofthese considerations limit exculpatory clauses sometimes inserted
in a trust at the suggestion ofa trustee, possibly without full understanding by the
settlor. As such, these provisions also may protect a settlor from overreaching
by a prospective trustee. Under either the common law or UTC Section 107, the
law designated by the settlor, absent different direction for specific matters, will
govern the duties, powers, and liabilities of the trustee, including such matters
as sales, investment, management, compensation, accounting, and control by the
courts-i.e., the matters usually relating to the administration and protection of
the interests of the beneficiariei.
Because the usual matters of administration occur at the principal place of
administration, the settlor's description of the principal place of administration
needs to be related to the corporate trustee's place of business or the individual
trustee's residence under UTC Section 108. The trustee is under a duty to

60. F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1242-44 (9th Cir. 1999).
61. Cf MACDONALD, supranote 39; SCOrr ON TRUSTS, supra note 1, § 622.
62. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 50 (Tentative Draft Nos. I & 2,

1996 & 1999).
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administer the trust at a place appropriate for its purpose. Section 108 also
provides expressly for moving the place of administration.
The common law has given extraordinary deference to the settlor's
intention, express or implied, in matters of administration and has permitted the
governing law regarding administration to be designated, divided, or changed.
As a consequence, there has been little choice of law controversy over the duties
and powers of the trustee identified in Article 8. When the trustee acts outside
the place of administration, there may be choice of law issues involving third
parties or there may be judicial jurisdiction issues relating to proceedings by or
against the trustee; however, these are generally not unique to trusts, and the law
most substantially related to the issue in dispute normally will be applied. If the
settlor does not designate governing law, choice of law centers on the principal
place of administration, which normally is located at the place of business of the
corporate trustee or the residence of the individual trustee.
In the case of trusts created by will, the most common place of
administration of both the probate estate and the testamentary trust is the testator
settlor's domicile. However, even there, occasional designations of a different
place of administration have been sustained.63 As a common manner of creating
inter vivos trusts has been to execute the trust instrument with an accompanying
transfer or delivery of assets to the trustee, corporate or individual, the place of
business of the trustee of an inter vivos trust is usually the place of
administration of the trust. If there are assets to be actively managed, such as a
going business or farm, requiring administration at the location ofthat particular
enterprise, there may be divided administration and specific directions that
include a choice of law designation as to a particular asset. Divided
administration simply may be what is necessary to carry out the trust's purposes.
This is well within the range of UTC Section 107, identifying the choice of law
as intended by the settlor or as most significantly related to the matter at issue.
UTC Section 108 permits a change of the place of administration or the
transfer of trust assets to a trustee at another location appropriate for the
administration of the trust. This also can change the law governing
administration." A simple example is where the trust involves discretionary
action or distribution for the support, assistance, or education of beneficiaries
who live in, or have moved to another state. Section 108 is drafted to
accommodate such a mobile trust in the effort to implement the settlor's
intention.

63. SCOT

ON TRUSTS, supranote 1, § 607.
64. SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supranote 1, § § 613-615; see Moore, supranote 48, at 6-
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2. Exercise of Trustee's Powers
Although the concept that the place of administration ordinarily determines
issues regarding the existence of or limits on the trustee's powers, the exercise
of the trustee's powers in the routine business of administering the trust can
involve the law ofotherjurisdictions. This is particularly true ofthe investment,
purchase, or sale of assets requiring registration or recording of title.
Registration or recording, for example, can occur in the purchase or sale of a
business, accounts receivable, mobile equipment, mortgages, or land. In such
a case, although there is no question as to the trustee's power, compliance with
local rules at the situs of the asset will be necessary to complete the transaction.
Transactions with third parties carry the risk of a breach of trust and thirdparty liability for participation in a breach of trust. Whether there is a breach
will be measured by the trustee's powers and duties under the trust and the law
governing them, but the liability of others may well depend upon the notice or
tainted knowledge requirements at the place where the third party acts. Again,
however, this is a normal choice of law reference to the law of the state most
significantly related to the matter at issue. Hence, determining whether a third
party is a bona fide purchaser of property wrongfully sold by the trustee will be
governed by the law applicable to that transaction, which need not be that law
that governs the trust generally. Many such matterg may come within other
uniform acts such as the Uniform Commercial Code, which has a choice of law
pattern compatible with the UTC.6"
As is often the case, concepts of judicial jurisdiction relevant to the parties
and the issue are crucial. Such is the case of the runaway trustee called to
account in a court where jurisdiction is obtained over the trustee or over assets
belonging to the trust. While the trustee's amenability to the forum is
determined by forum law, the obligation to account will be measured by the law
governing the trustee's powers and duties as discussed above. Historically,
courts have been quite willing to enforce foreign trust obligations against an
absconding trustee who is apprehended with their jurisdiction." A similar
pattern of resolving choice of law issues follows when a trustee wrongfully
injures a third party in the course of conducting trust administration. The issue
of liability to the injured plaintiff may well be determined by the law most

65. U.C.C. § 1-301 (as amended 2001) (original version at U.C.C. § 1-105 (1999));
see supra note 11.
66. See, e.g., Rogers v. Girard Trust Co., 159 F.2d 239, 242-43 (6th Cir. 1947);
Strawn v. Caffee, 178 So. 430,431-33 (Ala. 1938); Knox's Estate, 126 P.2d 108,110-14

(Cal. Ct. App. 1942); Application of Chassman, 99 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
Jones v. Jones, 30 N.Y.S. 177, 178-80 (Sup. Ct. 1894); cf UTC §§ 201-202 cmt.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/3
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related to the conduct of the trustee and the victim,' while the question whether
the trustee is entitled to reimbursement or must bear the recovery as a personal
liability would be governed by the law relating to trust administration.
Although this Article is concerned with choice of law questions, it should
be noted that litigation raises jurisdictional, as well as other, issues ofconflict of
laws. UTC Section 202(a) provides that the trustee submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the state regarding matters involving the trust by accepting the
trusteeship of a trust having its principal place of administration within the state.
This seems consistent with the reach of most long-arm statutes. Subsection (b)
of Section 202 also purports to subject the "beneficiaries" of a trust with its
principal place of administration in the state to the jurisdiction of this state with
respect to their interest in the trust "regarding any matter involving the trust."'
This Section likewise subjects the "recipients" of a "distribution" from the trust
"personally to thejurisdiction of... this state regarding any matter involving the
trust.

69

These "any matter" provisions of Section 202(b) may well be overly
extensive in some situations and may be constitutionally restricted to causes of
action reasonably related to the particular "interest" or "distribution" on which
jurisdiction is based. This possibility is somewhat suggested by Section 202(c),
which notes that other methods of obtaining jurisdiction over interested parties
in this or other states are not precluded by Section 202.70 These issues would be
resolved under the existing law relating to judicial jurisdiction over litigants.7
VI. CONCLUSION
The variety of matters that may call for a determination of choice of law
requires a statute that accommodates that variety and also does not preclude
reasonable approaches in resolving new and unforeseen issues generated by
changing circumstances. Assigning priority to the settlor's designation of the
governing law, subject to reasonable limits accommodating contrary state policy,
permits the settlor and the estate planner to consider and formulate directions to
resolve foreseeable issues. If no designation is made, reference to the law most
relevant, i.e., the law of the jurisdiction most significantly related to the matter
67. Cf.Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
68. UTC § 202(b).
69. UTC § 202(b).
70. UTC § 202(c).
71. See ScoL-s Er AL., supranote 19, at chs. 5-11; cf.Martin D. Begleiter, In the
Code We Trust-Some Trust Lawfor Iowa at Last, 49 DRAKEL. REV. 165,294 (2001).
For a discussion of the varied features of the trust that are reflective of the inpersonanm
in rein jurisdictional distinctions, see T.W. Merrill & H.E. Smith, TheProperty/Contract
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 843 (2001).
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at issue, accommodates and encourages thoughtful resolution of issues that are
not foreseen. The UTC does that with trusts, and its provisions provide an
approach that dovetails with the development of choice of law doctrine in other
areas of the law, as well.
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